Year: 2009
Type: book
Abstract: In this paper we investigate the efficacy of illicit electoral tactics and the characteristics\nwhich make a society prone to such tactics. We first investigate the chances of an incumbent\nhead of government winning an election. We find that in those elections in which illicit\ntactics were prevalent the chances of incumbent victory increase substantially, more than\ndoubling the expected duration in office. Further, illicit tactics sharply reduce the importance\nof good economic performance for survival in office. We then investigate what makes a\nsociety prone to illicit electoral tactics. Both structural conditions and institutions matter.\nSocieties that are small, low-income, and resource-rich have little chance of a clean election\nunless these conditions are offset by checks and balances such as veto points and a free press.\nAid has offsetting effects, the net effect being modest. We show that these results are robust\nto different measures of the conduct of elections and to fixed effects. Finally, we revisit the\nJones-Olken result that individual leaders matter for economic performance and find that it\nholds only where leaders are not disciplined by well-conducted elections.
Authors: Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2148280455
