Year: 2013
Type: preprint
Abstract: We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [6] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [7]. The idea is to extend the domain of the utility function to situations, maximal consistent sets in some language. The role of the underlying language in this framework is thus particularly critical. Of special interest are languages that can express only coarse beliefs [9]. Despite the expressive power of the approach, we show that it can describe games in a simple, natural way. Nash equilibrium and rationalizability are generalized to this setting; Nash equilibrium is shown not to exist in general, while the existence of rationalizable strategies is proved under mild conditions.
Source: arXiv (Cornell University)
Institution: Cornell University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Awards: G1523888516, CAREER: Computation and Collaboration in the Era of the Internet, RI-Small: Robust Game Theory and Decision Theory with Resource-Bounded Agents, Logic and Computability, G2646859444, G2918241329, AF: Small: New Barriers in Cryptography, Logic and Computability, G4227820399, G4388105696, G446035311, G469019871, G4713059963, G5001498423, G5175293516, G5541204808, G6187160294, G6628174956, G6671297155, G6741735475, G685164125, G707342011, G7452299184, G765784647, G7722981497, G7950983496, ICES: Large: Computation, Language, and Awareness in Games, III: Large: Causal Databases, G8289759875, G8295926295, G8651238734, G8690027106
OpenAlex ID: W2149258926