Work

On the Political Economy of Income Redistribution and Crime

Year: 2000

Type: article

Abstract: This article analyzes a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to specialize in either legitimate or criminal activities. Expenditures on police to apprehend criminals, as well as income redistribution, are determined endogenously through majority voting. We investigate how crime, redistribution, and police expenditures depend on characteristics of the underlying distribution of income‐earning abilities and on the apprehension technology. Our model accounts for the positive correlation between inequality and crime, the positive correlation between expenditures on police and redistribution, and the lack of correlation between crime and redistribution observed in U.S. data.

Source: International Economic Review

DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00053

Authors: Ayşe İmrohoroğlu, Antonio Merlo, Peter Rupert

Institutions: University of Southern California, New York University, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Language: English

Topic: Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2149677979

FWCI: 19.71

Cites: 32

Cited by: 139

Related to: 10