Faith and Goodness: a Reply to Hocutt
Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT: Professor Hocutt and I agree that David Hume first pointed out that “ought”—what should be done—cannot be derived from “is”—what is the case. Hocutt goes on to claim that “ought, ” in fact, derives from factual observation of “what we care about, ” which amounts to saying “you should do what you want to do. ” This seems to me unsatisfactory as moral philosophy. Key words: Hume, Moore, naturalistic fallacy, evolution, Fodor, moral In debate about “the good ” one thing is pellucid: it is not good to tangle with a philosopher, especially one as tough-minded as Max Hocutt (Jacques Derrida—or even Jerry Fodor [Staddon, 2008])—would have been easier to dismiss!). But, having inadvertently done so (Staddon, 2004), I must take my medicine and fight my way out as best I can. First, let me say that Hocutt and I agree on most things. For example, I agree that “An implication...is that the good and the right are relative, the first to persons, the second to societies ” (p. 171) where this is interpreted not as a moral claim but as a description. On the other hand, when he says “In the final reckoning,
Author: J. E. R. Staddon
Institution: Duke University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2150472215