The political economy of infrastructure construction: The Spanish Parliamentary Roads (1880-1914)
Year: 2010
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper examines the extent to which the public allocation of road\ninvestment was influenced by political and electoral goals during the Spanish Restoration\n(1874-1923). More precisely, we seek to identify those provinces that were favoured with\nhigher road construction expenditure and whether tactical strategies adopted by the political\nparties varied over time to reflect increasing political competition. In so doing, this paper\ncombines concepts from three strands of literature: legislative pork-barrel; clientelism and\nmachine politics; and electoral competition. Our main empirical finding for a panel of\nSpain�s provinces suggests that constituencies electing a higher proportion of deputies from\nminority or opposition parties were initially punished through lower levels of road\ninvestment but that, by the end of the period, they were instead favoured with more\nresources than the rest. In addition, we also observe that senior deputies who had been\nministers in previous administrations were more capable than other politicians of attracting\nresources to their constituencies.This paper examines the extent to which the public allocation of road\ninvestment was influenced by political and electoral goals during the Spanish Restoration\n(1874-1923). More precisely, we seek to identify those provinces that were favoured with\nhigher road construction expenditure and whether tactical strategies adopted by the political\nparties varied over time to reflect increasing political competition. In so doing, this paper\ncombines concepts from three strands of literature: legislative pork-barrel; clientelism and\nmachine politics; and electoral competition. Our main empirical finding for a panel of\nSpain�s provinces suggests that constituencies electing a higher proportion of deputies from\nminority or opposition parties were initially punished through lower levels of road\ninvestment but that, by the end of the period, they were instead favoured with more\nresources than the rest. In addition, we also observe that senior deputies who had been\nministers in previous administrations were more capable than other politicians of attracting\nresources to their constituencies.This paper examines the extent to which the public allocation of road\ninvestment was influenced by political and electoral goals during the Spanish Restoration\n(1874-1923). More precisely, we seek to identify those provinces that were favoured with\nhigher road construction expenditure and whether tactical strategies adopted by the political\nparties varied over time to reflect increasing political competition. In so doing, this paper\ncombines concepts from three strands of literature: legislative pork-barrel; clientelism and\nmachine politics; and electoral competition. Our main empirical finding for a panel of\nSpain�s provinces suggests that constituencies electing a higher proportion of deputies from\nminority or opposition parties were initially punished through lower levels of road\ninvestment but that, by the end of the period, they were instead favoured with more\nresources than the rest. In addition, we also observe that senior deputies who had been\nministers in previous administrations were more capable than other politicians of attracting\nresources to their constituencies.
Source: Documents de treball IEB
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Awards: G4833437358, G5727357968
OpenAlex ID: W2150537266
