Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: In this paper, we present two differential fault analyses on PRESENT-80 which is a lightweight block cipher. The first attack is a basic attack which induces a fault on only one bit of intermediate states, and we can obtain the last subkey of the block cipher, given 48 faulty cipher texts on average. The second attack can retrieve the master key of the block cipher, given 18 faulty cipher texts on average. In the latter attack, we assume that we can induce faults on a single nibble of intermediate states. Given those faulty cipher texts, the computational complexity of attacks is negligible.
Authors: Nasour Bagheri, Reza Ebrahimpour, Navid Ghaedi
Institution: Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,790
OpenAlex ID: W2150878966