Work

Non‐Obviousness and Screening

Year: 2013

Type: article

Abstract: The paper offers a novel justification for the non‐obviousness patentability requirement. An innovation involves two stages: research results in a technology blueprint, which development transforms into a profitable activity. An innovator, who is either efficient or inefficient, must rely on outside finance for the development. Only patented technologies are developed. Strengthening the non‐obviousness requirement alleviates adverse selection by discouraging inefficient innovators from doing research, but creates inefficiencies by excluding marginal innovations. We show that it is socially optimal to raise the non‐obviousness requirement so as to exclude bad innovators; we also provide several robustness checks and discuss the policy implications.

Source: Journal of Industrial Economics

DOI: 10.1111/joie.12031

Authors: Zonglai Kou, Patrick Rey, Tong Wang

Institutions: Fudan University, Institut d'Économie Industrielle, Toulouse School of Economics, University of East Anglia

Language: English

Topic: Intellectual Property and Patents

Subfield: Management of Technology and Innovation

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Industry, innovation and infrastructure

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2151981502

FWCI: 2.178

Cites: 49

Cited by: 11

Related to: 10