Year: 2006
Type: article
Abstract: No doubt, we human beings often think about objects, remember facts and imagine events – in short, we are in different intentional states. In many of these cases we do the thinking, remembering and imagining without the help of any external representation. If nothing else is meant than the occurrence of such an un-aided intentional state by the phrase “mental representation”, it is quite uncontroversial that mental representations occur. To distinguish this sense from others, I will use the phrase mental representing. Most would also agree that each occurrence of mental representing supervenes on an internal state of the human being which does the representing, possibly together with some fact about her/his environment. I will refer to such subvenient states as mental-representing enabling states. If nothing else is referred to by the phrase “mental representation ” than an internal, mental-representing enabling state, it is again fairly uncontroversial that mental representations occur. If, however, it is added that internal mental-representing enabling states are themselves mental in nature – i.e., that they are mental representing-enabling states – we begin to leave the arena of agreement. So, if the phrase “mental representations ” is loaded with this idea, it is not obvious that such entities exist. It is even less obvious and agreed upon that there are states, mental in nature and enablers of mental representing, which function like external representation in that the represented object is apprehended
Author: Helge Malmgren
Institution: University of Gothenburg
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2151981564