Work

Political Economy and the Efficiency of Compensation for Takings

Year: 2005

Type: article

Abstract: To assess compensation for regulation‐induced “takings,” the authors model political support for regulation as a function of externalities, landowner wealth, and tax burdens. When competing social interests have equal influence on political outcomes, compensation should not be paid. However, when environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence, the model yields several counterintuitive implications. For example, disenfranchised environmentalists should support takings compensation, since it reduces landowner opposition to regulation. The authors also show how compensation rules can limit the deadweight social costs of income transfers, while recognizing their effects on regulator and landowner behavior. (JELK11,D72,L51)

Source: Contemporary Economic Policy

DOI: 10.1093/cep/byj016

Authors: TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN, JAMES BOYD

Institutions: Resources For The Future, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Language: English

Topic: Property Rights and Legal Doctrine

Subfield: Law

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2152164491

FWCI: 15.79

Cites: 31

Cited by: 21

Related to: 10