Work

Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation—Evidence from 20 US Industries under the New Deal

Year: 2015

Type: article

Abstract: Patent pools have become a prominent mechanism to reduce litigation risks and facilitate the commercialization of new technologies. This article takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools that would form in the absence of effective antitrust. Difference-in-differences regressions of patents and patent citations across 20 industries imply a 14% decline in patenting for each additional patent that is included in a pool. An analysis of the mechanism by which pools discourage innovation indicates that this decline is driven by technologies for which the creation of a pool weakened competition in R&D. ( JEL K21, L24, L41, O31)

Source: The Journal of Law Economics and Organization

DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewv014

Authors: Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser

Institutions: California State University, East Bay, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York University

Language: English

Topic: Intellectual Property and Patents

Subfield: Management of Technology and Innovation

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funders: National Science Foundation, DePaul University, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research