Work

Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How Robust Is Reciprocal Behavior?

Year: 2014

Type: article

Abstract: We provide the second mover in a trust game and a moonlighting game with an excuse for not reciprocating. While this type of manipulation has been shown to strongly reduce giving in the dictator game, we find that the availability of the excuse has no effect on the incidence of reciprocal behavior in these games. Our results cast doubt on the generalizability of previous dictator game findings and suggest that image concerns are not a key driver of reciprocal behavior. (JEL C72, D64, Z13)

Source: American Economic Journal Microeconomics

DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.256

Authors: Joël J. van der Weele, Julija Kulisa, Michael Kosfeld, Guido Friebel

Institutions: University of Amsterdam, Goethe University Frankfurt

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: bronze

Funder: Agence Nationale de la Recherche