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CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation

Year: 2015
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks from firm performance before deciding on CEO retention. Using a hand‐collected sample of 3,365 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2009, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and, to a lesser extent, after bad market performance. A decline in industry performance from the 90thto the 10thpercentile doubles the probability of a forced CEO turnover.
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2154984633
FWCI: 111.1
Cites: 74
Cited by: 930
Related to: 9