Asymmetric Information, Signalling and Competition in the Credit Market
Year: 2003
Type: other
Abstract: This paper examines how credit market structure affects signalling under asymmetric information between banks and firms. In particular, it is shown that competition can be inconsistent with separating equilibria and, in turn, with efficient pricing rules. Under low competition contract differentiation is important, and good firms credibly signal their quality by choosing informative financial contracting.\nHowever, as competitive pressures increase the value of information necessary to separate shrinks and financial contracts becomes uninformative about quality.\nThen, separating equilibria do not exist and banks fail to price loans according to\nquality of applicant firms. Moreover, when all projects are viable, full competiton\nimposes a trade-off between investment financing and price-efficiency. With nonviability such a trade-off desappears.
Author: Federico Dini
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2155843896
