Year: 2013
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: This chapter provides an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which directed moods and emotions represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. According to intentionalism, a mental state's phenomenal features are determined by its representational features. Intentionalism is the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are reducible to, supervenient on, type or token identical to, or determined by its representational features. The identity version of intentionalism arguably faces the greatest challenges in accounting for moods and emotions. Intentionalism is at least initially plausible for experiences such as color experiences, shape experiences, and sound experiences.
Source: Routledge eBooks
Author: ANGELA MENDELOVICI
Institution: Western University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2156379564