Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy including atoms and a continuum of traders, who behave strategically. We show that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions and the atoms have the same utility functions and endowments, the Stackelberg-Cournot and the Cournot equilibrium equilibria coincide if and only if the followers’ best responses functions have a zero slope at the SCE.
Source: Theoretical Economics Letters
Author: Ludovic A. Julien
Institutions: Université de Bourgogne, Université Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, UCLouvain
Language: English
Topic: Economic theories and models
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W2156973113