Year: 2003
Type: preprint
Abstract: :\nSeveral economists have maintained that social sanctions can enforce cooperation in public good\nsituations. This experimental study investigates whether indirect social sanctions from monetarily\nunaffected observers can increase contributions to a public good. The experiment has two treatment\neffects. First, each participant's identity and contribution to the public good is revealed to the\nmonetarily unaffected observers. Second, information affecting participants’ beliefs about the degree\nto which the observers are contributors is introduced. The data suggests that indirect social\nsanctions from monetarily unaffected observers can increase voluntary contributions to public goods,\nprovided that the subjects have reason to believe that the observers themselves are strong\ncontributors.\nKeywords: conditional, cooperation, public good, social approval, social norms
Authors: Mari Rege, Kjetil Telle
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Norges Forskningsråd
OpenAlex ID: W2157927710