Work

Voting on the Budget Deficit

Year: 1988

Type: preprint

Abstract: This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule. Under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit, and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters.

Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

DOI: 10.3386/w2759

Authors: Guido Tabellini, Alberto Alesina

Institutions: Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Bocconi University, National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, Centre for Economic Policy Research

Language: English

Topic: Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W2158377372

Cites:

Cited by: 359

Related to: 10