Individual learning and social rationality
Year: 1998
Type: article
Abstract: Classical game theory assumes that players have a coherent model of the game in which they are engaged, that they make optimum plans assuming that everyone else makes optimum plans, and that all of this is common knowledge. Evolutionary game theory postulates instead that players have limited understanding of their environment, only modest reasoning ability, and no common knowledge. Surprisingly, a fair amount of classical solution theory survives with this change of perspective. We show how high-rationality solutions can emerge in low-rationality environments provided the evolutionary process has sufficient time to unfold.
Source: European Economic Review
Author: H Peyton Young
Institution: Johns Hopkins University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,690
OpenAlex ID: W2159226910