Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky's influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors's more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman's critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity.
Authors: Lieven Decock, Igor Douven
Institutions: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, KU Leuven
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,090
OpenAlex ID: W2159665220