Year: 1999
Type: article
Abstract: A prominent theme in much recent epistemology is that the requirements for knowledge are limited and context-dependent.The Relevant Alternatives Theory (RAT) is a systematic articulation of this point of view.Since it was put forward by Fred Dretske and Alvin Goldman, the RAT has undergone significant evolution, and it now enjoys broad acceptance.But I will argue that the theory in its current form (the "New Relevant Alternatives Theory") is deeply defective.It fails as a response to skepticism, and is untenable as a positive account of what and how we know.1. Elements of the New Theory It will be helpful, for expository purposes, to present a rough account of how the RAT has taken shape.I'll begin with the version of the theory presented by Fred Dretske in the 1970's.lWe need some terminology at this point.An alternative A to a proposition P is a logical contrary of P; A is an alternative to P just in case Pentails-A.Dretske puts the central thesis of the RAT as follows: "Knowledge...(is) an evidential state in which all relevant alternatives [to what is known]are eliminated" (1981), p. 367.To know P, one needs to "eliminate" only the relevant alternatives to P.You can know P despite your not having evidence that "eliminates" one or more irrelevant alternatives to P. Clearly, what makes an alternative relevant is an important question; so, too, is what it means to eliminate or rule out an alternative.I will address these issues in detail below, so let's leave them aside for now.As Dretske sees things, a principal virtue of the relevant alternatives approach is that it can serve as a corrective to skepticism.He analyzes the skeptical argument as follows:(1) If you know some mundane proposition M, then you know that you aren't the victim of massive sensory deception.2(2) You don't know that you aren't the victim of massive sensory deception.(3) Therefore, you don't know M. This content downloaded from 132.174.248.127 on Sun, 27 Nov
Source: Noûs
Author: Jonathan Vogel
Institution: Amherst College
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2160191919