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Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

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Year: 2000
Type: article
Source: Journal of Regulatory Economics
DOI: 10.1023/a:1008122015102
Authors: Mark M. Bykowsky, Robert J. Cull, John O. Ledyard
Institutions: World Bank, California Institute of Technology
Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications
Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: FCC spectrum auctions, combinatorial auctions, auction design, economic efficiency, auction revenue, threshold problem, spectrum licensing

Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2161924782
FWCI: 19.95
Cites: 25
Cited by: 179
Related to: 9
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