Year: 2006
Type: article
Abstract: In Life Itself and in Essays on Life Itself, Robert Rosen (1991, 2000) argued that machines were, in principle, incapable of modeling the defining feature of living systems, which he claimed to be the existence of closed causal loops. Rosen's argument has been used to support critiques of computational models in ecological psychology. This article shows that Rosen's attack on mechanism is fundamentally misconceived. It is, in fact, of the essence of a mechanical system that it contains closed causal loops. Moreover, Rosen's epistemology is based on a strong form of indirect realism and his arguments, if correct, would call into question some of the fundamental principles of ecological psychology.
Source: Ecological Psychology
Author: A.J. Wells
Institution: London School of Economics and Political Science
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W2163046499