Work

Epistemic aspects of representative government

Year: 2011

Type: article

Abstract: The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises as to how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for the epistemic costs of making decisions on the basis of that many fewer votes. This question is explored in the contexts of referendum democracy, delegate-style representative democracy, and trustee-style representative democracy.

Source: European Political Science Review

DOI: 10.1017/s1755773911000245

Authors: Robert E. Goodin, Kai Spiekermann

Institutions: University of Essex, Australian National University, London School of Economics and Political Science

Language: English

Topic: Political Theory and Democracy

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: bronze

Funders: Washington University in St. Louis, Trinity College Dublin, Arts and Humanities Research Council

Award: G3946159532