Modelos teóricos y evidencias empíricas de los efectos de la garantía en el crédito bajo información asimétrica
Year: 2003
Type: article
Abstract: One ofthe special features ofthe credit market is fue widespread use ofcollateral to guarantee fue loan contracts. The economic theory has proposed several static and dynamic models to justify this phenomenon. This paper intends to study the main explanations about the use of collateral in credit markets with asymmetric information, and to present a joint perspective. In static settings stands out fue conclusion that collateral requirements correctly combined with those of interest rates can induce separation of borrowers of different risk level. In dynamic settings, which have been scarcely studied, upholds fue fact that making collateral and interest rate dependable on the previous borrower outcome can result on a moral hazard reducing mechanism.
Author: Irene Ramírez Comeig
Language: Spanish
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W2166569264