Year: 2003
Type: preprint
Abstract: A game-theoretic model of anarchy, allowing for conflict is presented, which brings out the possibility of peace and prosperity in an equilibrium without government.It sheds some light on the issue of peace among nations without a supra-national government.Peace can be supported either by the promise of income transfers, which requires some commitment credibility, or by the gift of productive resource.This highlights the role of territorial concessions in securing peace among warlords or nations.It also brings out the link between the allocation of property rights and peace among unreliable players.An extension to the n-player case is presented as well.
Author: Jean‐Paul Azam
Institution: Université Toulouse-I-Capitole
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2167172223