Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: One response to the Frankfurtian attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is to advert to the observation that the agent’s actual action (or the particular event resulting from that action) is numerically distinct from the corresponding action (or the resultant event) he would have generated in the relevant counterfactual scenario. Since this response is based on taking actions and events to be fragile, I shall call it the fragilist account of alternative possibilities. This paper addresses an anti-fragilist argument delivered by John Martin Fischer. I contend that, on close examination, Fischer’s counterargument does not undermine the fragilist account.
Source: Dialogue
Author: HUIYUHL YI
Institution: Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology
Language: English
Topic: Free Will and Agency
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2167737350