Year: 2009
Type: report
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital.We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it.In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria.A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt.We test this and other implications of the model using country-and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government's role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.
DOI: 10.3386/w14648
Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, Collège de France, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London School of Economics and Political Science, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, École Polytechnique, Université d'Angers, ENSAE Paris, European Corporate Governance Institute
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W2167902785
