An Alternative to Kitcher's Theory of Conceptual Progress and His Account of the Change of the Gene Concept
Year: 2004
Type: preprint
Abstract: The present paper discusses Kitcher’s framework for studying conceptual change and progress. Kitcher’s core notion of reference potential is hard to apply to concrete cases. In addition, an account of conceptual change as change in reference potential misses some important aspects of conceptual change and conceptual progress. I propose an alternative framework that focuses on the inferences and explanations supported by scientific concepts. The application of my approach to the history of the gene concept offers a better account of the conceptual progress that occurred in the transition from the classical to the molecular gene than Kitcher’s theory. AN ALTERNATIVE TO KITCHER’S THEORY OF CONCEPTUAL PROGRESS 1 Philosophical accounts of the change of scientific concepts often focus on the reference of terms. Philip Kitcher goes beyond the mere study of reference by using his notion of the ‘reference potential ’ of a term, which allows for a more fine-grained study of conceptual change. In fact, Kitcher’s framework is probably the most sophisticated and interesting framework of conceptual change in the philosophy of science; and it includes an account of conceptual progress as well. Kitcher developed this approach
Author: Ingo Brigandt
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2170860242