Work

Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns

Year: 2007
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement‐period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire‐building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W3124242212
FWCI: 81.4
Cites: 108
Cited by: 2,081
Related to: 10