Year: 2011
Type: article
Abstract: A conservation law in physics can be either a constraint on the kinds of interaction there could be or a coincidence of the kinds of interactions there actually are. This is an important, unjustly neglected distinction. Only if a conservation law constrains the possible kinds of interaction can a derivation from it constitute a scientific explanation despite failing to describe the causal/mechanical details behind the result derived. This conception of the relation between “bottom-up” scientific explanations and one kind of “top-down” scientific explanation is motivated by several examples from classical and modern physics.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/660299
Author: Marc Lange
Institution: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2174035633