Year: 2015
Type: article
Abstract: It is often claimed that theory of mind (ToM) is facilitated by pretend play (PP), or by a particular type of PP, social pretend play (SPP).Here we challenge that view, proposing instead that ToM might be useful for driving SPP, rather than the reverse.We discuss background theory, review pertinent studies, and explain why the "ToM first" view is at least equally likely.The first form of pretend to consider is solitary PP, emerging at 12-18 months, in which one engages in three basic types of transformation: substitutes one object for another, projects imaginary characteristics onto objects, and imagines situations that do not exist (Leslie, 1987).The second form is social pretend play (SPP), which involves the same basic transformations but occurs with others, and emerges around age 3. We address these two forms of PP consecutively.There is a fundamental similarity, or isomorphism (Leslie, 1987), between PP and ToM.For all three types of transformation just described, PP involves projecting a different reality onto a situation, all while knowing what the real situation is (Lillard, 1993).For example, a child might mentally project a telephone onto a banana, engaging in both of the first two types of transformation.Similarly, understanding false belief-a foundational skill in ToM-involves understanding that someone is projecting a different reality onto a situation, when one knows what the real situation is.For example, a child might see someone as mentally projecting a chocolate bar inside a drawer, while the chocolate bar is actually in the cupboard.Theoretically, then, the ability to imagine a situation that differs from one's present reality underlies both PP and understanding others' minds, in particular, false belief (Leslie, 1987;Flavell, 1988;Forguson and Gopnik, 1988;Moses and Chandler, 1992).Leslie (1987) argued that the cognitive architecture that enables one to engage in PP also enables one to understand false belief, suggesting that PP should be related to ToM.Hence it is possible that PP engenders ToM by giving children practice at projecting representations that differ from reality onto that reality.In pursuit of evidence on this point, many researchers have examined the correlation between PP and ToM.For example, Taylor and Carlson (1997) assessed preschoolers' PP sophistication by examining their tendency to use imaginary objects in pretend action sequences (e.g., holding an imaginary toothbrush to brush one's teeth rather than using a finger as a toothbrush).The researchers examined whether this more sophisticated form of PP correlated with children's performance on standard ToM assessments.However, across many studies, findings are inconsistent: Although some observe significant relationships (Suddendorf et al., 1999;Nielsen and Dissanayake, 2000) others do not, even with the same measures and very similar samples (Schwebel et al., 1999; Lillard, 2001b).Even within studies that found that solitary PP and ToM were related, inconsistency was observed among measures.For example, Taylor and Carlson (1997) found that ToM correlated with self-but not objectdirected pretense, and Lalonde and Chandler (1995) found a significant relationship for "engages in simple make-belief actions alone" but not for "uses . . .objects for make-believe activities alone" (p.395).Cumulatively, these inconsistent findings undermine the idea of a reliable causal relationship between solitary PP and ToM.This brings us to the second type of PP, social PP.When children engage in SPP, they pretend to be other people with distinct thoughts and emotions.A major theory of how we understand
Source: Frontiers in Psychology
Authors: Rebecca A. Dore, Eric D. Smith, Angeline S. Lillard
Institutions: University of Virginia, Murray State University
Language: English
Subfield: Developmental and Educational Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,801
OpenAlex ID: W2176267640