Year: 2002
Type: report
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: Why an institution’s rules and regulations are obeyed or disobeyed is an extremely \nimportant question for regulatory agencies. This paper discusses the findings of an \nempirical study that shows that the use of threat and coercion as a regulatory tool—in \naddition to being more expensive to implement—can actually produce the opposite \nbehaviour from that sought. Using survey data collected from 2301 taxpayers accused of \ntax avoidance, it will be demonstrated that variables such as trust are just as important for \ndetermining compliance. If people trust the motives of authorities, they are more likely to \nview those authorities as acting fairly, to consider them legitimate, and to defer to their \ndecisions voluntarily. It is therefore argued that to effectively shape desired behaviour, \nregulators will need to move beyond motivation linked purely to deterrence. Strategies \ndirected at reducing levels of distrust between the two sides may prove particularly \neffective in gaining voluntary compliance with an organisation’s rules and regulations.
Author: Kristina Murphy
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2176531565