Year: 2012
Type: report
Abstract: First, we replicate the remarkable result of Hossain & Morgan (AER\n2009), in which subjects in an experimental market tip almost perfectly to\nthe superior platform even if an inferior platform enjoys initial monopoly.\nNext, we show that this result disappear when seemingly innocent increases in out-of-equilibrium payoffs are introduced. The inflated payoffs do not alter payoff- or risk-dominance relations, and does not impact on\nplayers' security levels. We conclude that the need for a theory of equilibrium selection cannot be bypassed by appealing to the realities of the\n(experimental) market place.
Source: BIBSYS Brage (BIBSYS (Norway))
Authors: Tom‐Reiel Heggedal, Leif Helland
Institution: BI Norwegian Business School
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Norges Forskningsråd
OpenAlex ID: W2184719799