Work

Insider Trading: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work

Year: 2003
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper analyzes the academic and regulatory studies on insider trading available in the finance literature. First a review of the laws regulating insider trading is provided. The paper then takes a look at the parties involved in insider trading, and analyzes the theories of insider trading and empirical evidences. Finally, the paper concludes by giving some indication as to the direction of future research on insider trading. INTRODUCTION Insider trading has been of particular interest to society in the past decades because of a series of schemes that have netted insiders millions. Names like Boesky, Milken, and Levine have become commonplace to followers of financial news and the general public alike. Insider trading is the sale or purchase of securities by corporate insiders, using monopolistic information to their advantage to generate abnormal returns. Monopolistic information is privileged, price sensitive, and material nonpublic information. Material refers to information which is likely to affect significantly the market price of the issuing company’s securities or which is likely to be considered important by reasonable investors in determining whether to trade a particular security. As a group, insiders must be those who would generally seem to have easy access to privileged information; they are likely to comprise a company’s executives and employees and their tippees, as well as a company’s bankers, auditors, stockholders, financial advisors, and other related parties. Insiders may be identified as the directors of listed companies and their spouses and children. Those who most successfully, but perhaps illegitimately, use privileged pieces of information are likely to be those who do not disclose their existence to the authorities and manage to escape detection through, for instance, the use of nominee holdings. Stock splits, dividend increases, and merger announcements can have substantial effects on share prices. Consequently, insiders trading on such information can clearly profit before the announcement is made. While such trading is illegal under U.S. securities laws, the fact that the market often at least partially anticipates the announcements suggests that it is possible to profit on the basis of privileged information. Corporate insiders typically do well when trading stocks of their own companies. Stocks purchased by insiders often outperform the stocks in a randomly selected group. Moreover, the distributions by “knowledgeable” sellers have often preceded significant price declines. Thus, the strongest form of the efficient market hypothesis is clearly refuted. While citations on insider trading indicate that the very strongest form of the theory is not valid, there is considerable evidence that the market comes reasonably close to strong-form
Institution: Shantou University
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2185345512
Cites: 94
Cited by: 13
Related to: 10