Work

Stern-Judging: A Simple, Successful Norm Which Promotes Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

Year: 2006

Type: article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity, believed to constitute the biological basis of morality. We employ an evolutionary game theoretical model of multilevel selection, and show that natural selection and mutation lead to the emergence of a robust and simple social norm, which we call stern-judging. Under stern-judging, helping a good individual or refusing help to a bad individual leads to a good reputation, whereas refusing help to a good individual or helping a bad one leads to a bad reputation. Similarly for tit-for-tat and win-stay-lose-shift, the simplest ubiquitous strategies in direct reciprocity, the lack of ambiguity of stern-judging, where implacable punishment is compensated by prompt forgiving, supports the idea that simplicity is often associated with evolutionary success.

Source: PLoS Computational Biology

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020178

Authors: Jorge M. Pacheco, Francisco C. Santos, Fabio A. C. C. Chalub

Institutions: Centro de Física Teórica e Computacional, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Centro de Matemática e Aplicações, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $3,043