Year: 2014
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: In J. W. Sherman, B. Gawronski, & Y. Trope (Eds.). (2014). Dual-process theories of the social mind (pp. 3-19). New York, NY: Guilford Press. Chapter 1 Two of What? A Conceptual Analysis of Dual‑Process Theories Bertram Gawronski, Jeffrey W. Sherman, and Yaacov Trope The emergence of dual- process theories is probably one of the most significant theo- retical developments in the history of social psychology. The overarching assumption of dual-process theorizing is that the men- tal processes underlying social phenomena can be divided into two distinct categories depending on whether they operate in an automatic or nonautomatic fashion. 1 Over the past decades, dual-process theories have made important contributions in virtu- ally all areas of social psychology, and this volume showcases the most recent devel- opments since Chaiken and Trope’s (1999) seminal volume, Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology. Despite the ubiquity of dual-process theo- ries in social psychology, their conceptual foundations have also been the subject of ongoing debates. In this chapter, we pro- vide a metatheoretical analysis that aims at clarifying the explanatory function of dual- process theories, the conceptual nature of their underlying dualities, and structural features that characterize different types of dual- process theories. Expanding on this analysis, we discuss the criticism that dual-process theories are unfalsifiable and whether the realm of mental processes can indeed be divided into two distinct catego- ries. Our conclusion is that dual- process theories have provided vital insights into the mental underpinnings of social phenomena. However, their explanatory and predic- tive value depends on (1) a clear distinction between operating principles and operating conditions, (2) conceptual rigor in the defi- nition of the proposed dualities, (3) precise formulations of empirical hypotheses about covariations between processing duali- ties, and (4) clearly specified links between the hypothesized mental processes and the causal relations between stimuli and behav- ior they are supposed to explain. Expanding on this analysis, we conclude with a brief outlook on emerging themes and future directions in dual-process theorizing. Explanatory Function A useful framework to clarify the explana- tory function of dual- process theories is Marr’s (1982) distinction among three lev- els of analysis in psychological research: the computational level, the algorithmic level, and the implementational level. Accord- ing to Marr, research at the computational level is concerned with identifying rela- tions between inputs (i.e., stimuli and their broader contexts) and outputs (i.e., judg- ments and behavior). The overarching goal of research at the computational level is to identify which types of inputs produce Sherman_DualProcessTheoriesSocialMind.indb 3 1/2/2014 12:56:47 PM
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2188388886