Pockets of Effectiveness: Why Do Strong Public Institutions Exist in Weak States?
Year: 2013
Type: preprint
Abstract: Compared to work on differences in state capacity between developing countries little attention has been paid to variation in state capacity within these countries. This paper examines one particularly counter-intuitive phenomenon that has been largely neglected thus far: strong public organizations in weak or patrimonial states. Why and how do such “pockets of effectiveness” (PoE) emerge? Based on the detailed analysis of two surprisingly effective public organizations in Nigeria’s patrimonial politico-administrative system I distinguish three typical problems that have to be solved so that PoE can emerge in this environment. These are the problems of how non-patrimonial action can be institutionalized in a patrimonial system (the innovation problem), how the actors involved in that process that deviates from common patrimonial practice make sure that no one defects from this effectiveness agenda (the control problem), and finally how a whole organization can be built that consistently resists the incentives that patrimonial systems offer (the organizational forging problem). It turns out that a relational and cultural perspective that focusses on networks, weak and strong ties between actors, on their power relations and reciprocal commitments as well as assurance practices and organizational culture and identity explains best how the actors involved can solve these typical problems to successfully establish pockets of effectiveness in patrimonial systems.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Michael Roll
Institution: University of Wisconsin–Madison
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2193057766
