Year: 2019
Type: article
Abstract: Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies (ratio analysis of conditional probability, chance-credence coordination) are not satisfactory, I develop a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief, transferring Ramsey’s classical proposal to statistical inference. The analysis saves the alignment, explains the role of chance-credence coordination, and rebuts the charge of arbitrary assessment of evidence in Bayesian inference. Finally, I explore the implications of this analysis for Bayesian reasoning with idealized models in science.
Source: Philosophy of Science
DOI: 10.1086/707554
Author: Jan Sprenger
Institution: University of Turin
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: H2020 European Research Council
OpenAlex ID: W2992992225