Year: 2015
Type: report
Abstract: Do individuals prefer to compete fairly, or unfairly with an opponent? We study \nindividuals who can choose how to compete for one ex-post nonzero payoff. They can \neither nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information \nand actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate \ntheir opponent's action. In an experiment, we observe significant altruism under rules \nwhich allow for fabrication and sabotage, but not under rules which allow for spying. \nWe provide direct evidence that this altruism emanates from an ethical concern purely \nover the distribution of decision rights. How individuals deal with this concern - whether \nthey nudge themselves into fabrication-free, spying-free, or sabotage-free rules, or whether \nthey assume the power to fabricate or sabotage to compensate their opponent by giving \nall payoff away - varies along with individuals' attitudes towards power.
Source: MADOC (University of Mannheim)
Authors: Nadine Chlaß, Gerhard Riener
Institutions: University of Turku, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Award: G2745623164
OpenAlex ID: W2195973396