Year: 2012
Type: preprint
Abstract: Experimental evidence from simple distribution games supports the view that some individuals have a concern for the effciency of allocations. This motive could be important for the implementation of economic policy proposals. In a typical lab experiment, however, individuals have much more information available than outside the lab. We conduct a lab experiment to test whether asymmetric information influences prosocial behavior in a simple non-strategic interaction. In our setting, a dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We find that a substantial share of subjects behaves proscially and a concern for effciency plays an important role. In our experiment the information asymmetry is actually effciency-enhancing as more subjects behave prosocially than under symmetric information.
Authors: Evguenia Winschel, Philipp Zahn
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Award: G1450655456
OpenAlex ID: W2208923798