Year: 2015
Type: article
Abstract: Dogmatists and phenomenal conservatives think that if it perceptually seems to you that p, then you thereby have someprima faciejustification for believing that p. Increasingly, writers about these views have argued that perceptual seemings are composed of two other states: a sensation followed by a seeming. In this article we critically examine this movement. First we argue that there are no compelling reasons to think of perceptual seemings as so composed. Second we argue that even if they were so composed, this underlying disunity in metaphysical or psychological structure would fall below the threshold of epistemic significance.
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12114
Authors: Elijah Chudnoff, David Didomenico
Institution: University of Miami
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2217330376