Economic complexity, regime transition and sectoral forces: the impact of trade unions on democratization in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Zambia
Year: 2015
Type: dissertation
Abstract: This thesis interrogates uncertainty in transitional politics in South Africa, Zambia,\nand Zimbabwe. It questions why some countries transition to democracy and some\nstagnate or revert to authoritarianism. To address the dual nature of political\ncontingency and structural formations in transitional politics, it adopts a conceptual\nframework based on economic complexity, to ascertain the relationship between\neconomic structures and the results of regime transition. This study engages with the\nextensive literature linking economic development and democracy throughout the\nworld, to see if it can be applied to the recent and on-going transitional events across\nAfrica. It identified trade union confederations as economically important actors\nwhose political contingency was directly affected by the sectoral composition of\neach country’s economy. In other world regions, trade unions have been of import\nin determining transitional outcomes, and this thesis interrogated whether the same\nwas true in three African countries.\nThe concept of economic complexity was developed to offer a conceptual\nframework through which to understand transitional politics. It was argued that the\nmore complex the economy, the more likely democracy was to emerge following\ntransition because there would be more factors in play in the political-economic\narena that could erode a regime’s relative power and thus bestow power onto other\nactors who could utilize it for regime change. In terms of indicators, economic\ncomplexity was composed of five features – sectoral spread, state intervention and\ninvestment, formal sector employment, level of unionization, and level of foreign\nprivate investment – and it was argued to impact strongly on transitional politics\nbecause economic complexity tempered the power relations amongst salient\npolitical-economic actors. Economic complexity allowed for the examination of\neach countries sectoral composition, which then was hypothesized to mediate the\npower relations of each countries economic actors and subsequent transitional\ntrajectory.\nIn terms of research findings, the economic complexity argument certainly had\ntraction at an empirical level. Countries with more complex economies were more\nlikely to be democratic regimes after transition. More interestingly than this simple\npoint however was that it was changes in complexity that proved to be of great\nimportance in triggering opportunities for mobilization. Throughout the three cases\nthe general outcome was that increased complexity resulted in higher levels of\ndemocratization as a transitional outcome, but it was changes in complexity,\nupwards or down, that actually got transitions moving. So, mobilization can be\ntriggered during times of economic change, not only economic failure. In all three\ncases conditions of economic change - declining complexity, constrained\ncomplexity, and mutated complexity – triggered the development of a movement\nthat could challenge the dominance of the state.\nThe contribution of this study lies in the conceptual framework developed to\napproach regime transitions. The findings contribute to broader debates in the\ntransitional literature, pointing to the possibilities that sectoral examination can have\nfor determining a regime outcome. It highlights the interconnectedness of structures\nand agency in regime transitions.
Author: Ciara McCorley
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
Funder: Sasol
OpenAlex ID: W2218245803
