Mutual Optimism and Unilateral War
Year: 2010
Type: preprint
Abstract: In this paper we examine whether mutual optimism can be supported as a cause of war in models that permit the unilateral use of force. Previous work (Fey and Ramsay, 2007) has demonstrated that war cannot occur in any game in which both sides must agree in order to fight. With the more realistic assumption that either side can unilaterally use force, however, war is possible in equilibrium. But we show that mutual optimism is still not a valid explanation for war, because it is neither always necessary or sufficient for war in a wide range of models. In particular, we show that this is true for a broad class of models with unilateral force as well as bargaining models.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Authors: Mark Fey, Kristopher W. Ramsay
Institutions: University of Rochester, Princeton University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2242985164
