Legal Reasoning: Justifying Tolerance in the U.S. Supreme Court
Year: 2007
Type: preprint
Abstract: The concept of tolerance is central to liberal political and moral traditions, yet it raises a number of challenging questions. Is tolerance unlimited? When is it required? If acts or beliefs are morally wrong, why tolerate them at all? If they are not morally wrong, is tolerance still necessary? Indeed, the paradox of tolerating the intolerable has attracted significant attention in liberal political and moral writings. Several lines of justifications have been offered in the attempt to resolve the paradox of tolerance. John Locke and John Stuart Mill justified tolerance primarily on utilitarian grounds, while contemporary justifications center on notions of personal autonomy and pluralism. This Article tracks a shift within the liberal tradition from utility-based to autonomy- and pluralism-based justifications for tolerance. It further attempts to locate a similar shift in legal argumentation for tolerance, as offered by liberal Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of homosexuality, and to demonstrate that the transformation of in general liberal discourse trickled into liberal adjudication.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Harel Arnon
Language: English
Topic: Law, Rights, and Freedoms
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2252702198
