Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers
Year: 2006
Type: preprint
Abstract: This chapter first reviews the economic theory underlying the unilateral competitive effects of mergers, focusing on the Cournot model, commonly applied to homogeneous products; the Bertrand model, commonly applied to differentiated consumer products; and models of auctions and bargaining, commonly applied when a bidding process or negotiations are used to set prices. This chapter then reviews two classes of empirical methods used to make quantitative predictions of the unilateral effects of proposed mergers.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Authors: Gregory J. Werden, Luke M. Froeb
Institutions: United States Department of Justice, Vanderbilt University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2254630711