Selection Effects and Economic Sanctions
Year: 2010
Type: preprint
Abstract: Several scholars have tried to import arguments about selection effects from the literature on deterrence crises into the context of studies of economic sanctions. They claim that datasets of economic sanctions episodes oversample highly motivated target states, because less motivated targets should be expected to concede invisibly at the threat stage, before sanctions are imposed. As a result, they claim that sanctions are really more effective than they appear. However, the structure of the strategic interaction in economic sanctions cases does not exactly mirror the structure in deterrence crises, so we should not expect to find the same selection effect. This article explains the differences and their implications for empirical studies of economic sanctions effectiveness.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Eugene Gholz
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2261553308