Year: 2013
Type: report
Abstract: Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of Bayesian repeated large anonymous games. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C72
Source: Econstor (Econstor)
Authors: Ehud Kalai, Eran Shmaya
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2263936571