Work

Congressional Court Curbing and Legislative Gridlock: Constraining or Maintaining Judicial Independence?

Year: 2013
Type: preprint
Abstract: During periods of Congressional Court-curbing, ideological divergence between the Supreme Court and Congress has been found to consistently impact judicial review even though the legislation is rarely enacted. Building on the theoretical models of separation of powers and Congressional policymaking, this study diverges from previous studies by arguing that not only do the preferences of Congress matter, but also the preferences of each chamber and the President. The level of ideological agreement between the executive and legislative branches is hypothesized to serve as a more credible signal to the Court of the seriousness of Court-curbing legislation and the likelihood of overrides following judicial decisions. To examine the influence that divided government and legislative gridlock have on the Court’s exercise of judicial review, or the number of Acts of Congress that are invalidated, during periods of Court-curbing spanning 1973-2008 (93rd-110th Congresses), Poisson regression analysis is used. The findings indicate the Court’s concerns for overrides and institutional legitimacy operate simultaneously; however, the constraining effect of Court-curbing does not differ across most political or institutional conditions.
Author: Lisa Hager
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2266468870
Cites: 42
Cited by:
Related to: 10