The economics of family and group decisions
Year: 2004
Type: dissertation
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: This thesis examines group decision-making processes with emphasis on \nhouseholds’ decisions and behaviors. It is interesting to study the underlying \ndecision-making processes within multi-person groups and organizations by \nextending and applying our knowledge in microeconomic theory: what is the \nraison d’tre for such institutions, when they are created and dissolved, and how \nthey aggregate and resolve different preferences and values among members. \nThe first essay estimates the trade-off between child quantity and quality by \nexploiting exogenous variations in fertility due to son preference, which prevails \nin many Asian countries. I find for the sample of Korean households that \ntaste covariance is not minimal; adverse effects of fertility on child quality is, \nif any, smaller than what would be inferred from a cross-sectional relationship. \nThe fall in fertility rate over the past decades does not account for increasing \ninvestment in children’s education. Linking population policy to fostering \nhuman capital could be misleading. \nThe second essay utilizes longitudinal data to analyze the spouse’s individual \nbudgets – “pocket money.” This unique data set allows for the specification \nof simultaneous process of household decision-making in a fully stochastic \nfashion. By doing this, it is possible to differentiate unobservable spousal bargaining \npower from heterogeneity at the household level. I find that while \nincreasing female labor force involvement does lead to resource reallocation \ntoward women within households, the favorable effect is not significant. On \nthe other hand, a general improvement of family income has negative impacts \non intra-household inequality, which partially confirms the Kuznets curve at \nthe micro level. Lastly, spouses are significantly different in their preferences \nfor education and clothing, but they are not for some other goods. \nThe last essay examines a different context, beyond households, in \nwhich a group of individuals make aggregate decisions. Using the data on \nfigure skating judges’ scorings, I find significant evidence for the existence of \noutlier aversion. Individual judges manipulate scores to achieve a targeted \nlevel of agreement with the other judges, and the dispersion of scores depends \nupon the type of judge-assessment system. One major implication of \nthis paper, which is at variance with the industrial psychology and personnel \nmanagement literature, is that agreement may not be a good criterion for the \nvalidity of an evaluation system.
Author: Jungmin Lee
Language: English
Subfield: Gender Studies
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2268951129
