Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment
Year: 2017
Type: article
Abstract: An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups yield the same outcome. (JEL C72, D82, D83, K41)
Source: American Economic Review
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150913
Authors: Sergiu Hart, Ilan Kremer, Motty Perry
Institutions: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Warwick
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2269282189